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TREATISES
6 Am Jur.2d Attachment and Garnishment §488 (2007)
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REPLY STATEMENTS OF FACT
The Brief of Bud Bailey does not contest the Statements of Fact set forth in the
Cache Valley Bank Brief. Bailey's Brief does add additional Statements of Fact
providing more details as to the proceedings below. The critical facts set forth in the
Cache Valley Bank Brief justifying its refusal to remit funds remain uncontested; to
wit:
4.

The Writ of Garnishment was delivered to Lori Parker, an administrative

assistant/secretary at the Bank on November 1st. (R. 235)
8.

On November 1st, 2006, Cache Valley Bank setoff the total amount in the

account of $17,901.94 to its Suspense Account and then applied that sum against a
loan owed by Construction Associates, Loan #51-027480, on November 17 ,
2006. (R. 214, 216)
9.

As of November 1st, 2006, Cache Valley Bank had three loans owed to it

by Defendant Construction Associates dba KRT Drywall, all of which were
delinquent and in default as of that date; to wit:
a. Note dated September 13, 2000, amount of 150,000.00. (R. 140-41)
b. Note dated July 10, 1998, amount of $125,000.00. (R. 142-143)
c. Note dated November 7, 2002, amount of $46,300.00. (R. 211-212)
10. All three Notes were secured by security interests by Commercial
Security Agreements covering bank accounts, instruments, chattel paper, all
contract rights, all retention amounts, claims and causes of action. Said security
4

interests were duly filed. (R. 146-158, 209,)
11. That Defendant Construction Associates, Inc. dba KRT Drywall was in
default on all three Notes as of November 1st, 2006. (R. 216-218, 220-222, 224227)
12. That each of the loan agreements specifically granted the Bank a right of
setoff; to wit: "I agree that you may set off any amount due and payable under this
note against any right I have to receive money from you." See back side of each
Loan Agreement, section highlighted as "SET-OFF". This right is also repeated in
the section relative to "REMEDIES." (R. 143, 145, 212)
13. The security agreement dated November 7 , 2002, among other
designations of collateral has a box next to "Deposit Accounts" marked with an
"X" to signify that all of the bank deposit accounts of Construction Associates are
security for the loan obligations owed to Cache Valley Bank. (R. 206)
14. The other security agreements also list, on the front page of each, the
accounts of Defendant Construction Associates dba KRT Drywall as security for
the aforesaid loans. On the back of each sheet under "REMEDIES" and elsewhere
in this document Cache Valley Bank is formally given the right to setoff funds in
its bank deposit accounts. (R. 146-155)
15. Notice of all of the security agreements were duly filed with Financing
Statements with the State of Utah and are duly on record. (R. 157-58, 209)
16. All of the deposits into the bank deposit account of Construction
Associates were proceeds from its accounts receivable and, as such, were also
5

proceeds from the secured accounts receivable of Construction Associates, duly
secured as such to Cache Valley Bank. Id.

SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT
The Bailey Brief suggests that this appeal challenges a fact based decision of
the trial court, hence there is a duty to marshal supporting facts. That suggestion is in
error; this appeal is not based in contesting findings of fact. The contempt for which
Cache Valley Bank is charged is its refusal to pay over funds at the time of the
garnishment and subsequently its failure to pay over additional funds deposited after
return of the garnishment. Cache Valley Bank's refusal to pay over these funds was
based upon its assertion of legal rights to the continuing control and securitization of
the debtor's bank account to its outstanding loan. Those legal rights are established in
the revised Article 9 of the Utah Commercial Code. The Bailey Brief ignores the
decisive legal issue. The Bank has "control" and "perfection" of the deposit account
to its security agreements. Hence, the Bank was justified in setting off the account.
This is not a continuing garnishment, hence, there is no duty as to subsequently
deposited funds.

6

REPLY ARGUMENT
I.

BAILEY'S ARGUMENT THAT THERE IS A FAILURE TO MARSHAL

EVIDENCE AND/OR MEET AN APPELLATE BURDEN IS IN ERROR.
At Point I of its Brief, Bailey suggests that Cache Valley Bank has failed to
perfect its appeal by a marshal of the evidence supporting the trial court's decision.
The argument is misplaced as Cache Valley Bank is not appealing a fact based
decision. There are no germane facts to this appeal that are contested. As noted in its
Summary of Argument,1 Cache Valley Bank brings its appeal to this court arguing
that as a matter of law, the Bank was not in contempt for its failure to remit funds
based upon the garnishment order of the District Court. These are legal arguments as
to the proper interpretations of law, principally Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
As demonstrated by its Statement of Facts repeated in relevant part in this
Reply Brief, there is no dispute as to the facts that support Cache Valley Bank's legal
refusal to remit funds. Cache Valley Bank was a secured creditor very specifically and
legally secured in the banking account of the judgment debtor. Additionally the Bank
had "control" of the particular bank account at issue as described in the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code, Section 70A-9a-104. Those facts are not in dispute. Nor were
those facts ever disputed at the trial court level. The arguments at the trial court level
and now at this appellate level by Bailey can only be that Cache Valley Bank's legal
position is incorrect; that notwithstanding its securitization position, the Bank had a
1

Cache Valley Bank Brief at page 21-22.
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funds in the account at the time of receipt of the writ of garnishment. The second
i1 J .MTnination is as to subsequent funds deposited in the account. The legal answer to

I here is, however, a brief discussion of offset rulings in other jurisdictions
prior to 1990. In making that argument,, Bailey cites a Nebraska case , a Sixth Circuit

From, these cases the Bailey Brief attempts to establish a lena! requirement that there
are three steps necessary for an offset, all of which supposedly must be done prior to
and/or upon receipt of a writ of garnisl lment.
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The three cases were decided prior to 1990 and do not refer to nor constitute
Utah case law even during the 1990 time period. None of these three cases deals with
the position of a bank specifically securitized to bank accounts under the revised
Article 9. None of these three cases has any relevancy to the "continuing
garnishment" theory of Bailey.
These cases predate by more than a decade Utah's amendment to Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. That Revision was for the precise purpose of
clarifying the rules at issue herein pertaining to obtaining and perfecting security
positions in commercial bank deposit accounts. Additionally the statute establishes
the rights of banks to setoffs against such securitized accounts. The pre Revision
confusion on these rules and standards is what led to the development and adoption of
these specific amendments to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The
resulting Revision was adopted by almost all jurisdictions. The process of controlling
bank accounts and the interplay of offset rules were the very subject of that Revision.
The Revision should be considered as replacing much of the existing Utah case law
and the case law of other states where the Revision was passed.5
For a thorough discussion of the history of the Revision to Article 9 and the
process leading to it, there are two excellent journal articles. See Barkley Clark,
Revised Article 9 of the UCC: Scope, Perfection, Priorities, and Default, 4 N.C.

5

The UCC Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code was adopted and
then made effective in Nebraska on July 1, 2001. R.R.S. Neb. (U.C.C.) § 9-101
(2008) Official Comments. Ohio has also adopted the revisions, also effective July 1,
2001. ORC Ann. 1309.101 (2008) Official Comments.
9
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checks to other parties. The trial judge demanded an explanation based upon his
misunderstanding of legal concepts at issue. For example, Hearing Transcript at pages
8-9, Second Addendum to Appellant's Opening Brief.
The Bank's response then and now is the same. First, there is no continuing
garnishment in this case so the Bank has no duties to Bailey as to subsequent account
activity. Second, the Bank was actively monitoring the account to make sure
payments (checks) were being made on accounts necessary to eventually realize
payment on the receivables that the Bank anticipated being the source of further loan
payments. The characterization of this as a "de-facto receivership" is partially
accurate. The Bank was monitoring the account and exercising some discretion and
control as to ongoing payments.
This writ of garnishment was not a "continuing garnishment;" it was a one shot
garnishment. The writ of garnishment applied only to funds in the account upon its
service, after that it ceases to have legal effect. Once the Bank responded to the
garnishment, the presence and/or knowledge of the outstanding judgment has no legal
effect whatsoever. Bailey can issue another writ but it cannot elevate its one shot
garnishments into a continuing garnishment. Whether or not Bailey or the trial judge
approve of the de-facto receivership is immaterial; Bailey has no legal rights as to
subsequent deposits unless a new writ is issued.
Bailey's Brief entirely ignores the cited Utah cases establishing the legal
principle that under Utah law, garnishments like the one issued Bailey, are one shot
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instruments. Bailey accurately expresses its legal position and that of the trial judge in
the following quotation from its Brief:

The district court was correct when it stated "they [Cache Valley Bank]
either had to take them [subsequent deposits] themselves or give them to
somebody that had a higher security interest" that being the Appellee.

Bailey Brief at page 9. But the correctness of the trial judge's decision is nowhere
supported by any legal authority whatsoever.
The legal position referenced requires a legal determination that this
garnishment has a continuing legal effect and constitutes in some measure a "higher
security interest" thereafter diminishing in some way the Bank's "control." That is
simply not the law; the trial court is making a mistake as to what the law is. Cache
Valley Bank's Brief correctly cites long established and respected Utah case law; to

By the great weight of authority the liability of the garnishee is limited
to the property of the defendant in the possession or under the control of
the garnishee, and the indebtedness of the garnishee to the defendant at
the time the writ of garnishment is served. The writ does not render the
garnishee liable for property coming into his possession, or
indebtedness incurred after the writ has been served.

Acheson-Harder Co, v. Western Wholesale Notions Co., 72 Utah 323, 325; 269 P.
1032, 1034; 60 A.L.R. 881 (Utah 1928).

The court must ascertain the rights and liabilities of the respective
parties as of the time of the levy of the writ of garnishment... In view
of the documentary evidence, the court should have found that the bank
12

was indebted to defendant Shire as of the date of the levy of the writ of
garnishment.

Seaboard Finance Co. v. Shire, 111 Utah 546, 218 P.2d 282, 287 (1950). The Utah
case law cited represents the majority position:

An attachment lien covers only the actual interest or indebtedness
existing at the time of the attachment, and will not reach debts or
property subsequently acquired. Similarly, a writ of garnishment
covers only the property or money of a debtor in the hands of the
garnishee or the indebtedness which the garnishee has a present
obligation to pay to the judgment debtor at the time of the service of
the writ, and nothing beyond that.

6 Am.Jur.2d Attachment and Garnishment §488 (2007). (emphasis added). The
minority position is that the time period is extended from the date of service of the
Writ until the garnishee's answer is made. Id. Bailey's only response to these Utah
case supported argument, is to recite the trial court's discussion. That is not
responsive to or dispositive of the legal arguments made in this appeal.

CONCLUSION
Bailey's Brief does not contest any of the facts recited by Cache Valley Bank's
brief. Bailey's Brief responds to Cache Valley Bank's legal arguments by simply
ignoring them. Bailey's Brief fails to make a single citation or reference to the revised
Article 9 of Uniform Commercial Code. That law is the controlling law as to bank
rights in deposit accounts and their exercise of setoffs in Utah. Bailey's Brief ignores
13

and fails to discuss or distinguish established Utah law finding garnishments only
attach funds held upon service. Bailey's Brief suggests no legal or factual basis as to
why its garnishment should be deemed a continuing garnishment under Utah law.
The Court of Appeals should make a legal determination that Cache Valley
Bank had a right to setoff all funds and that it did offset all funds upon receipt of the
garnishment. The legal basis for such a decision is that Cache Valley Bank had
"control" of and was "perfected in" the Construction Associates deposit accounts. The
deposit accounts were attached by its security interest. In addition, any funds in those
accounts were proceeds from collateral (accounts receivable) that were also security
for the Bank's loans. The court should also find that the Bud Bailey Construction Writ
of Garnishment was not a "continuing garnishment." The legal decision of the trial
court should be completely reversed.
The determination to award attorney's fees award should also be reversed as it
is based upon the trial court's errors on the first two issues. In addition the court
should find there was a failure to follow Rule 4's requirements for service of process.

DATED August 22nd, 2008.

DAINES & WYATT

N. George Daines
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